

# Learning from COVID-19: State-citizen Conviviality

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### **Abstract**

This paper uses a comparative case study analysis informed by a quantitative data analysis to investigate how conviviality influenced State-citizen relations in response to COVID-19. This paper proposes a conceptual framework which combines conviviality under a state of emergency with trust and social solidarity, (de-)centralised governance, open/closed civil space, embedded autonomy, and institutionalised co-production. The COVID-19 state of emergency, paired with time, resources, and budget constraints, showed opportunities for both state and citizen to spontaneously, forcibly, and necessarily co-produce activities and policies in achieving common goals across different countries; however, there are still elements that can be improved, and these elements can vary depending on the terms and conditions of the state and its citizens. It remains to be seen whether states and citizens will be able to institutionalise the convivial relations they have developed throughout the COVID-19 pandemic and carry them into a post-pandemic world.

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## Preface

The basis of this research originally stemmed from the substantial differences or contradictions between the roles and objectives of state and citizens. State political ideologies, such as idealism, realism, liberalism, to name a few, sometimes build a transformative force that changes the reality of society or attune to the general population's needs which can lead to less internal conflict within society. However, in reality, state political ideologies have given rise to political passivity, totalitarianism, biopolitics, state capitalism and power struggles among states. This leads to results that differ from or do not correspond to an individuals' objective for 'Subsistence', meaning that "the activity of self-reliance and self-existence in human life that does not depend solely on the market or state" (Ilyich, 1982, p.68) and "self-definition and self-control of a good life by utilizing own capabilities" (Mies and Tomsen, 2000, p.345). Negative elements caused by state political ideologies are not simply a matter of state's responsibility per se, but also a matter of citizens seeing the state as 'a tool to be used' for their own benefit, or forming the normative values and rules to compensate for their incapacity to influence a state. Thus, the question arose as to whether it is possible for the state and citizen to balance both macro and micro problem structures, processes and narratives in order to create practical solutions in bridging the state-citizen's roles and objectives. In the meantime, we saw the emergent phenomenon in which the state and citizens seek to know, care for, work side by side for each other to resolve socio-economic issues during the COVID-19 crisis. Such cooperative action could be seen in a limited number of government-citizen meetings or public private partnerships; however, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, various political/environmental factors came into play in solving the national emergency, therefore, the State-citizen developmental relations can be more explored in a substantive and concrete manner through a comparative analysis across different countries. I hope this research will help to clarify the challenge between states and citizens and their adaptation of the values and systems that founded on the shared ideologies.

## **Acknowledgements**

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## ***Introduction***

Even prior to COVID-19, cultural mistrust, political polarization, social contestation, the closing of civic space, and growing inequality was impacting on state-citizen relations around the world (Baldassarri and Bearman, 2007; Stiglitz, 2012; Tekmen, 2017; Trinh et al., 2019). However, a key response to COVID-19 from world leaders and nations was to endeavour to reduce the impact that the virus might have on the economy, governance, and health systems, to name but a few, in cooperation with citizens and civic organisations.

Given this, the COVID-19 pandemic presents an opportunity to explore and lay the groundwork for genuine transformation of ideas, policies, programmes, practices, and systems involved in state-citizen relations (Taylor, 2021). As all citizens are at risk of COVID-19 infection and the national control measures are extremely complex and diverse, problems cannot be handled by single or specific agents in a one-size-fits-all manner. Developing effective collaborations between different states and social stakeholders is therefore crucial to addressing the uncertainty and unpredictability of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Considering that, both the state and civil society should be encouraged to not only expand their response network and service provision, but also to improve the policies and actions that have been adopted by mobilising or conducting aid under the constraints of time, resource and budget (Alves and Costa, 2020; OXFAM et al., 2020). This dissertation will seek to examine what the responses of different countries have been to the opportunity to build greater conviviality between state and citizens during the COVID-19 pandemic; it will also question whether it is possible to institutionalise the lessons learned from these experiences in order to carry them into a post-pandemic world in a sustainable manner.

The emergence of COVID-19 has highlighted the shortcomings of the welfare state in particular as it has been unable to meet the needs of the public due to governmental, market, and supply failures (Alves and Costa, 2020). In response to this complex global public health emergency and aforementioned failures, various authors (cf. Kövér, 2021) have now started to conceive of citizens and informal civil society as more formal entities and collaborators that are on par with the state when it comes to creating services and goods for public utility. As Alves and Costa (2020) argue, the state and civil society have become more interdependent than conflictive during the COVID-19 pandemic, with informal forms of organised responses being increasingly considered essential for the partnership with the state (CIVICUS, 2019).

As the pandemic developed, Mutual Aid (MA) groups and volunteer groups began to form and act with a sense of cooperation all over the world (Domínguez et al., 2020; Miao et al., 2021). Various cases of spontaneous civil society mobilisation to minimise the harm caused by COVID-19 were also seen – a response that could be enhanced through state assistance and coordination. Many states have also become more flexible in their approach not only to public services, but also to public-private partnerships and government-to-citizen partnerships, drawing on ‘whole-of-society’, ‘at all actors at all levels’, and ‘catalysis of open governance’ approaches (Abd et al., 2021; Bellows and Zohdy, 2020; Dubb, 2020). Some international organisations and academics regard these movements as the beginning of conviviality as they are facilitating two-way communication, or an interdependence, between state and civil society (Alves and Costa, 2020; Convivial Thinking, 2021; Kövér, 2020). Thus, since the roles of states and citizens have been promoted, their relationships have come to be seen as key to understanding and building back better for a post-pandemic world. As conviviality also tries to build modes of living which are not based on the externalisation of costs and exclusivity, but are

instead socially and ecologically generalisable (Steffens, 2017), convivial practices can potentially capture the changes in state-citizen relations seen during the pandemic.

While various concepts have been studied in relation to building conviviality, only a few studies have been carried out which focus on 'state-citizen' conviviality during 'emergencies' (Alves and Costa, 2020; Bryson et al., 2015). This dissertation therefore seeks to address this gap by examining: i) the pre-existing political contexts, external conditions and state-citizen convivial approaches under which new state-citizen relations have emerged during the COVID-19 emergency; and ii) the different ways of exerting opportunities to build greater conviviality between state and citizens. A greater understanding of the driving factors that underlie state-citizen conviviality will not only aid in understanding how conviviality can be encouraged in possible future emergencies, but also in non-emergency situations which may come to be considered the 'new normal'.

In order to answer these questions, this paper will first outline the conceptual framework, beginning with the co-concepts of 'conviviality', 'state and citizen relations in the state of emergency'. It will then move on to explain the quantitative analysis that was conducted to establish the trends and patterns of state-citizen relations and state governance across 172 countries before moving on to examine the results of the comparative case study analyses carried out on Brighton, Budapest, Tokyo, and Wuhan. Finally, the summary and findings from the comparison among four cities according to the conceptual framework will be discussed.

### ***Conceptual frameworks***

The concepts most relevant to this dissertation are Conviviality, Social Solidarity, Institutionalised Co-production, Embedded Autonomy, Open/Closed Civil Space, and (De-)Centralized Governance.

### *Conviviality*

The concept of conviviality has a wide range of definitions and contexts (Hemer, 2019). Depending on the circumstances, it can mean equity, social solidarity, gift exchange, mutual respect, the natural environment etc. It also sometimes assumes collective responsibility for the ways we act, engage and live (ibid). The term conviviality in this paper combines Adloff's (2019 and 2020) definition of conviviality and Ilyich's (1973) conditions for the achievement of conviviality, but it will be used specifically to refer to state-citizen relations/coexistence as an end in itself. Furthermore, it will not be seen as a temporary manifestation, but as a more durable aspect of post-pandemic society. The criteria for conviviality will be set as follows (Adloff, 2020, p.118):

- (a) Conviviality requires minimal civil standards of nonviolence and tolerance of difference
- (b) Conviviality means the forms of interaction in which people encounter other people without stereotyping, reifying, or assigning denigrative attributions
- (c) Conviviality stresses equality and self-organisation and calls for non-hierarchical and democratic forms of organisation
- (d) In convivial relations, one strives not to live at the expense of others, i.e. the externalisation of the negative consequences of actions should be avoided

The concept of conviviality shows that "it is essential to develop a new philosophy and practical forms of peaceful coexistence" (Adloff, 2020, p.112). When this conviviality emerges in state-citizen relations, it is specifically defined as state-citizen conviviality. As conviviality exists at all times and in all cultures (ibid), it is also applicable to the socio-political coexistence between the state and citizens. However, the main reason for focusing on state-citizen relations from the conceptual view of conviviality is that COVID-19, as a state of emergency, automatically satisfies certain conditions for

achieving state-citizen conviviality. According to Ilyich's book 'Tools for Conviviality' (1973), there are three steps that need to be taken to achieve a convivial society:

1. That an increasing number of people become enlightened about the reality of the crisis being faced
2. That people who demand the right to a convivial life are brought into the community
3. That any limits regarding the development of available tools are discovered by the community and that they are utilised to their fullest regardless

These three points are all evident in the social responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. In the first condition, the perception of the crisis is obvious as the status quo cannot address the various socio-economic issues caused by governmental, market, and supply failures. As for the second condition, the formation of MA groups, civil organisations, non-profit organisations (NPOs), and inter-governmental cooperation has been active in most countries, indicating that this condition is being met. 'Tools' in the third condition is used as a broad concept that includes not only tools as 'objects' but also 'technology', 'infrastructure', and 'systems'. Crucially, tools are productive and a means to an end, but beyond a certain point they become counterproductive. An example of this is that while a government's wide-ranging COVID-19 measures may improve the health of citizens, the high cost and potential for coercive policies may create social costs that far outweigh the benefits and this may result in doubt when being 'forced' to receive medical care or follow orders. Ilyich (1973) argued that each social environment has a corresponding set of natural scales, and tools that demand time, space, and energy far beyond the provisions of their corresponding natural scales are nonfunctional in their respective dimensions. Hence, each individual and group should assess and use the tools around them, defining a 'convivial way of life and relationship with others' through their own decision-making and control. Since this can be done as a political process (Ilyich, 1973; Hinchliffe and Whatmore, 2006),

it allows us to consider how the government can regard more informal civic activities as a central COVID-19 measure, and how the citizens can deal with the government's response. This suggests that it is theoretically not only possible, but also appropriate to apply the term conviviality to state-citizen relations.

#### *Social solidarity and Trust*

As seen from Adloff's definition, there is an emphasis on the need for 'Social solidarity' and 'Trust' to be harmoniously interdependent with each other. In Adloff's (2020) work, social solidarity is defined as "a form of mutual respect through exchanging gifts, which itself is based on social ties and reciprocal indebtedness" (p.115). Solidarity is also embodied in the norms of common interests and reciprocity as well as in the mutual support among and within communities. This is based on the notion that humans are not primarily logical or rational egoists, but rather have a cultural and psychological disposition toward solidarity and generosity (Michéa, 2014). Regarding citizen-to-citizen trust, this develops when effective practices - built on reciprocity, emotional bonds, and/or positive expectations - become norms or are formalised or proven to be reliable (Barber, 1983; Gulati, 1995; McAllister, 1995; Ostrom, 1990; Rousseau et al., 1998; Zucker, 1986). It is clear that the mutual trust and solidarity among people based on the common norms they have built up together is related to every element of Adloff's conviviality.

#### *De-centralised state*

Social solidarity and trust often emerge and form within the same or relevant community, but not between general populations or government bodies, nor between people who live at a distance or who have never met (Trinh et al., 2019). This is relevant since the degree to which power and authority are centralised or decentralised is key to understanding the different COVID-19 response strategies which affect the manner in which state-citizen conviviality emerges (Alves and Costa, 2020). This is because

centralised states highlight the authority of the central government and blur the responsibilities between central-local ties, making it easier to adopt and implement policies in a top-down fashion (León & Orriols, 2019; Wimmer, 2018). In contrast, Manor (1999) and Faguet and Sánchez (2008) defined decentralised states as the devolution by the central government of specific functions, with all of the administrative, political, and economic attributes that these entails, to regional and local governments that are independent of the central state within given geographic and functional domains.

Neither term, however, is confined to democracies as nondemocracies can also experience governance and decentralisation. Given this, theoretically sound definitions of decentralisation should not exclude authoritarianism (Faguet, 2014). Decentralised regimes have three modes: 1) deconcentration or administrative decentralisation, 2) fiscal decentralisation, 3) devolution or democratic decentralisation in which nations have devolved to their sub-national states (Manor, 1999). These modes of decentralisation can occur concurrently or individually. When deconcentration happens alone, or in conjunction with fiscal decentralisation but without decentralisation, higher-levels of governmental intervention occurs in lower-level political arenas while accountability remains with the higher-levels of government. This allows central authorities to penetrate lower-level political arenas more efficiently without increasing the power of organised forces (ibid), which often leads to repression on civil society, as can be seen in China.

#### *Open/Closed civic space and Authoritarian/Liberal regime*

Even where decentralisation facilitates closer relations between different socio-political entities, governmental structures by themselves cannot redress the divides, conflicts, or closed spaces that form between the decentralised state and citizen (Baldassarri and Bearman, 2007). Civic space is defined as “a space for civil society – [it] is the bedrock of any open and democratic society. When civic space is open, citizens and civil organisations are able to organise, participate and communicate without

hindrance” (CIVICUS, 2019, p.7). When citizens have the freedom to participate, they can assert their rights and influence the social and political systems around them. This can only happen when a state holds by its duty to protect its citizens and facilitates and respects their constitutional and basic rights to assemble, associate peacefully and openly express their opinions and views. On the other hand, when civic space is closed, it reflects a weakening protection of civil and political rights (Hossain et al., 2018).

The reason why civic space and its relation to political regimes is one of the criteria for the analysis of conviviality is that synergies between states and citizens tend to be reflected in the nature of civic space, as civic space clearly reflects political space, including the nature of the political regime and state capacity (Van and Terwindt, 2012). For instance, states that threaten human development and growth through structural transformations have historically emerged in settings in which ruling governments control authority through mostly political spaces where civic space is relatively closed (White, 1994; Hossain et al., 2018). This can often be seen in authoritarian regimes that eliminate political/social solidarities and connections in the name of civil liberties and market decisions, the result of which is that collective alternatives are not striven for (Adloff, 2019). In this case, closing civic space adversely effects development. However, an important counterpoint to this presumption is that arguments about closing civic space might not be detrimental to development, especially in instances where authority and state capacity are fragmented or weak and growth is uneven or fragile such as in China (Hossain et al., 2018). On the other hand, Lorch (2008) and Lorch and Bunk (2017) show how civic society or civic actors could come to act on behalf of or be co-opted by authoritarian governments, rather than necessarily championing the democratic process. Liberal regimes, with their strong emphasis on markets, also overlook the possibilities of societal self-organisation (Adloff, 2019). All in all, better civic space or liberal regimes do not always translate into better state-citizen relations. However, this cannot be applied to the current COVID-19 state of emergency where both state

capacity and the mobility of civil society must be maximised to deal with the crisis. It is therefore reasonable to consider civic space as a state-citizen conviviality indicator in instances where the state of emergency cannot be overcome without civic society acting to bridge the state and the citizen.

### *Embedded Autonomy*

While the influence of political regimes and structures on civilians and the importance of the roles of both the state and citizens in emergencies have been described, state-citizen conviviality is not static (Ilyich, 1973). Given that it requires dynamic relations between state and citizens, especially in emergencies, it is necessary to consider not only the system but also the internal factors that foster and sustain their relations. This dissertation will therefore also use the concept of ‘Embedded autonomy’ (Evans, 1995), which describes state-society collective action under the assumption that any deterioration of the state tends to coincide with the disorganisation of civil society. While it is possible to see the similarity between social solidarity and embedded autonomy, which fundamentally requires social ties and reciprocal indebtedness, embedded autonomy more explicitly shows the importance of pre-existing systems within the state and civil society (called Embeddedness) and their connectedness with each other or to different societies (called Autonomy) (Evans, 1996; Bryson et al., 2015). This is why a state that is only autonomous would lack both sources of intelligence and the ability to rely on decentralised private and civil implementation, while an over-reliance on connecting networks without a robust internal structure would leave the state incapable of resolving ‘collective action’ problems, or transcending the individual interests of its private counterparts. Only when embeddedness and autonomy are joined together can a state and civil society be called ‘developmental’ (Evans, 1996).

Although embedded autonomy is the underlying structural foundation for effective state participation in industrial development and transformation, Evans and Heller (2018) broadened their understanding of the notion of the developmental state beyond economic terms. The mechanism of their embedded

autonomy functions in how the ties that bind state and civil society across the public-private divide are disciplined by the state and civil autonomy and stem from the threat or fear of emergency. Therefore, rather than being limited to economic transformations, this perspective of development can be extended to a broader spectrum of state and citizen capability when dealing with emergent governance, the free market, supply failures, and crises (Chen, 2020).

### *Co-production and Institutionalisation*

Embedded autonomy demonstrates that the state's autonomy is rooted in a concrete set of social connections that bind the state intimately to specific social groups and society, offering institutionalised channels for the continual collective negotiation and re-negotiation of policies and goals. The next thing to consider therefore is the collaborative work that occurs between state and citizens, its permanence/institutionalisation, and the definition of each. Based on Ostrom's definition of co-production (1996) as "the process through which inputs used to provide a good or service are contributed by individuals who are not in the same organisation" (p.1073), co-production is one of the more tangible aspects of conviviality since it involves more than one person or institution working together in the production of a service or good. However, as this dissertation addresses state-citizen conviviality, the more precise concept of 'Institutionalised co-production' is employed. Institutionalised co-production is defined as "the provision of public services through regular, long-term relationships between state agencies and organised groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions" (Joshi and Moore, 2004, p.31). As solidarity is embodied in the 'norms' of state-citizen reciprocity and emerges in the 'public sphere', narrowing down the definition of co-production to Ostrom's norm would make the analysis more precise; however, in emergencies, this institutionalisation could be temporarily improvised, and given that the interest of this paper is to examine whether it is possible for this institutionalisation to become permanent, such a definition is not suitable. Lastly, the term 'institutionalisation' in this paper does not suggest a change or

formalization of rule configurations that are goal-oriented but a process and idea-consolidation intended to regulate societal behaviour within organisations or entire societies. This will help in the analysis of how it is possible to institutionalise the lessons learned regarding state-citizen conviviality during the COVID-19 emergency and carry them into future (non-)emergencies.

### *Citizen and civil organisation in civil society*

Before turning to the methodology, the terms ‘citizen’ and ‘civil organisation’ should be clarified since their treatment by the state can be distinct. The term citizen, in this paper, refers to actors in the ‘public sphere’ who exercise ‘active citizenship’ in pursuit of common interests. It does not refer to NPO or formal organisations, but rather to solidarity groups with broad-based coalitions, alliances, and movements (Edwards, 2009). Civil society refers to “all forms of social action carried out by individuals or groups<sup>1</sup> who are neither connected to, nor managed by, the state” (WEF, 2013, p.8), including citizens and informal civil groups. Civil societies that are not classified as citizens, such as NPO or formal and certified organisations, are called ‘civil organisations’. Abzug and Webb (1999) view civil society as “a residual form of the state, or as a complementary element in the regulation of the capitalist order” (p.416), meaning that civil society reinforces the will of the state. This is mostly because a number of researchers only perceive spaces of competition and conflict between the state and civil society (Titmuss, 1974; Offe, 1984; Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981; Salamon and Anheier, 1998; Najam, 2000). However, during states of emergency, state-citizen conviviality takes on the role of the citizen more than the role of the state (Kövéér, 2021).

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<sup>1</sup> Civil society encompasses a spectrum of actors with a wide range of purposes, constituencies, structures, degrees of organisation, functions, size, resource levels, cultural contexts, ideologies, membership, geographical coverage, strategies and approaches

## ***Methodology***

Despite structuring the conceptual framework to understand state-citizen conviviality, the variation of state-citizen conviviality across different contexts, especially during states of emergency, is still too complex to comprehend. Resolving this complexity, a mixed method approach will be carried out using a comparative case study analysis informed by quantitative and qualitative data. A quantitative analysis of potential driving factors and geographical/political features that underlie the state-citizen conviviality was undertaken, using the data of 172 countries that included four different countries - Japan, the UK, China, and Hungary. To answer the central research question of this dissertation concerning the responses of different countries to the opportunity to build a greater state-citizen conviviality in the wake of COVID-19, both primary and secondary data regarding the four case studies was analysed. The comparison between the countries was conducted based on two criteria: i) open/closed spaces before and after COVID-19 outbreak; ii) (de-)centralized states.

### *Quantitative analysis*

Along with the 2020 trust level dataset of 71 countries from the UNDP, time-series, cross-sectional data of 172 countries from the last 16 years, including the period of the Global Financial Crisis 2007-2009, was taken from the V-DEM dataset. Although the four case studies comprise the main analysis of this dissertation, quantitative data using relevant concepts of state-citizen conviviality will help to identify the general patterns and relations between state and citizen thereby making the results of this qualitative analysis more generalisable.

### *Qualitative analysis*


Based on the quantitative analysis, four countries were selected which fit with each quadrant in *Diagram 1*, before four governance units were selected according to available data. An analysis of available literature regarding the case studies of China (Wuhan), Japan (Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo), Hungary

(Budapest), and the UK (Brighton) was undertaken along with online semi-structured, exploratory interviews with 15 key performers at both a state and citizen level. These included a mayor, bureaucrat, council worker, public health worker, CEO of a social business, professor, journalist, founder of a civil group (MA group, foodbank, volunteering group), and several citizens, all of whom were interviewed via ZOOM from 14<sup>th</sup> of July to 28<sup>th</sup> of August. In order to evaluate state-citizen relations from various perspectives, the interviewees were selected through direct contact on LinkedIn and Facebook, or through referrals from other interviewees. The content of the interview questions was flexible and changed according to the interviewee's activities, ideology, and positionality of state-citizen relations. Based on the results of the quantitative analysis of the interviews, the questions were also contextualised by country.

#### *Selection of countries for the research*

To systematically select and split the case studies, two concepts were utilised to analyse how different political and civil backgrounds affect states and citizens in building conviviality: i) open/closed spaces before and after the COVID-19 outbreak; ii) (de-)centralized states (*cf. Diagram 1 below*). These concepts were selected not only because they help bring to light the pre-embedded system within which the state and citizens exist, but also to indicate the normative structures or spaces of society and politics which can either sustain or destroy the foundations for developing citizenship and a sense of community (Michéa, 2014).

Diagram 1: Criteria for case selection



Source: Made by author referring to V-DEM (2020), World Bank (2020), and CIVICUS (2019)

To determine the liberal and authoritarian regime as well as the civic space before and after COVID-19, the LDI ranking (V-DEM, 2020), PanDem ranking (ibid), and WGI (World Bank, 2020) (*cf. Table 1 below*) were assigned to each country in *Diagram 1*. In addition to LDI, civic space closure from CIVICUS was also introduced. The CIVICUS Monitor (2019) posted 536 civic space updates, rating them from open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed to closed space. In this dissertation, this conceptual framework will be applied to state-citizen conviviality, taking into account the geographical/political features that differ from country to country.

Table 1: LDI, PanDem, WGI.

<i>LDI ranking</i>	Liberal Democracy Index measures the quality of elections, suffrage, freedom of expression and the media, freedom of association and civil society, checks on the executive, and the rule of law (V-DEM, 2020). The higher the ranking in the data of 144 countries, the more Liberal the democracy achieved.
<i>PanDem ranking</i>	The Pandemic Violations of Democratic Standards Index (PanDem) captures the extent to which state responses to Covid-19 violate democratic standards for emergency responses (V-DEM, 2020). The higher the ranking in the data of 144 countries, the worse the Pandemic Violations will be.
<i>WGI</i>	Worldwide Governance Indicators are a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprises, citizens and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. The unit of these indicators is a percentile from 0 (worst) to 100 (best) (World Bank, 2020).

Source: Made by author

These ranking systems can be used to highlight the socio-political situation of the case studies in the following way. China is fundamentally fiscal, administratively federal and predicated on single-party rule (Montinola et al., 1996) with poor public accountability. Without devolution or democratic decentralisation to sub-national states, these socio-political circumstances tend to enhance the leverage of those at the system's apex, leading to a decline in the choice of policy strategy or formation of closed-to-open-access transitions (Clune, 1993; Faguet, 2014; Goel et al., 2017). This is, however, attributed to serious informational resource issues that are intrinsically tied to the direction and form of accountability rather than a legislative balance of authority. Since administrative and fiscal decentralisation have been achieved, China is classified as a relatively decentralised state as opposed to a centralised one (*cf. Diagram 1*) in this paper. Furthermore, the authoritarian Chinese regime

recorded the 20<sup>th</sup> worst score of government violations on democracy during COVID-19 and its civic space is regarded as 'closed'.

Japan is also positioned in this paper as a decentralised regime with a high achievement in terms of liberal democracy. During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the government of Japan achieved a significant degree of decentralisation. Local governments as active players in policymaking processes have achieved a degree of autonomy that has allowed them to manage aspects of public policy in areas such as regional development, welfare, environmental development, and governmental information disclosure (Ichikawa, 2017). They also gained a wide range of functions and fiscal responsibilities, and a fusion of responsibility and finance exists, with two-thirds of all government expenditure being local (Furukawa and Menju, 2013). On the other hand, Mayama (2018) claimed that the central government still retains a considerable degree of administrative authority, and in many cases the work is carried out through local governments that operate as agencies of the central government. Furthermore, local governments are subject to various constraints on policy formation and decision-making, and the awareness of developing their own policies that reflect local conditions and resident needs has not taken root (ibid). Lastly, although pandemic violations on democracy are not a big problem in Japan, there is no civil awareness or citizen-based movement of development through anti-system opposition (*cf. Appendix 1*) so civic space is regarded as 'narrowed'.

The UK is composed of four nations with varying degrees of autonomy. Unlike Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, England does not have a national government and parliament. England has a highly centralised system of government in which executive, legislative and financial powers are concentrated centrally, and the powers of local governments are very limited (Gash et al., 2015). Although England has a well-established legal system, high local and regional government autonomy, and has achieved egalitarianism and liberal democracy (top 12 out of 144 countries) (*cf. Appendix 1*),

civic space is regarded as ‘narrowed’. Also, violations on democracy for emergency responses was more intensive than Japan. During COVID-19, with the swift failure of existing regulatory measures, the British state was forced to improvise with emergency and highly authoritarian measures. On March 25, 2020, Parliament passed the Coronavirus Act in one day without debate or scrutiny. It granted executive sweeping authoritarian powers, enabling ‘government by decree’ until the present day (Ewing, 2020). That is why the UK is positioned in this paper as a centralised regime.

Hungary is positioned in this paper as a centralised state with obstructed civic space. Elements of both centralised and de-centralised administration are apparent as Hungary has strong ‘anti-hierarchy’ sentiments within its local government systems (Szigetvári, 2020). Despite the impact of EU membership on the new structure of regionalism and decentralisation initiatives in Hungary, since the Orbán government took power in 2010, strong centralisation efforts have served to increase the power of the state (ibid). As a consequence of the reforms on centralised governance, most of the decision-making power has been transferred to state organs meaning that local political roles have been greatly devalued. The majority of the local decision-making elite is no longer made up of people dependent on local governments, but of state-dependent local leaders. The score of liberal achievement in democracy itself is above average in Hungary due to partial civil anti-system opposition and pre-political regimes. However, the government is exercising its right to destabilise democracy by taking advantage of emergency acts during the COVID-19 pandemic, leading to the 40<sup>th</sup> worst PanDem score.

### ***Quantitative analysis on the trend of conviviality-related variables***

In the quantitative analysis, the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative technique and robust multiple regression analyses were employed for the 2005-2020 time-series cross-sectional data and 2020 cross-sectional data with citizen-to-citizen trust data. In *Appendix 1*, the description of data and variables, summary

statistics, and result of regression, including correlation analysis of variables in four countries, are illustrated.

The main findings from the data from 2005-2020 shows that civil anti-system opposition and local government autonomy (where there is no interference from unelected bodies at the local level) has a positive but small effect<sup>2</sup> on whether governments reflect the voices of civil society in the policies ( $Y_1$ ) with a 1% statistical significance, regardless of whether they are formal or informal, large or small. On the other hand, when the CSO participatory environment ( $Y_2$ ) is a dependent variable, the results are the same in the case of  $Y_1$ , except for several crucial points. Flexible CSO entry and exit environment, where the government does not impede CSO formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities to violently overthrow the government, and the liberal achievement of democracy are both factors in fostering CSO participatory environment ( $Y_2$ ) with a 1% statistical significance (*cf. table 5*).

The year of COVID-19 in 2020 also shows that citizen-to-citizen trust has a positive impact on the CSO participatory environment ( $Y_2$ ), which is significantly different from zero at the 1% statistical level. In contrast to ‘pluralistic policy making’ (where the government unilaterally cooperates with citizens), in the ‘CSO participatory environment’ citizens are expected to take an active role and also the government would be required to develop space and opportunity for the formation of CSO initiatives.

Through the above quantitative analysis, trends over the past 16 years for the four case study countries have been captured. Anti-system movements through state-citizen space, and an independent local government influenced the central government’s policy making, reflected by the decisions of civil

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<sup>2</sup> However, since the coefficient is small (0.02), the effect of anti-system opposition on ( $Y_1$ ) is significant, but not ‘sizable’.

society. In addition, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the government's tolerance toward civic activities and the increase of citizen-to-citizen trust has had a significant impact on the civil participatory environment. To understand the more micro-level dynamics determining whether or not conviviality has developed and become institutionalised, however, this study also undertook qualitative research informed by above quantitative results, focusing on specific cities within each case study country.

### ***Results of Case Study Analyses***

#### *Case 1: Brighton (England)*

The results of the quantitative analysis in *Appendix 1* shows that the UK has one of highest attainments of liberal democracy, with little government regulation on civic activities. One feature that distinguishes the UK from other countries is the high correlation between liberal democracy and civic anti-system opposition, at 0.83, suggesting that civil activism and the open civic space that facilitates activities are leading to the liberalisation of democracy where protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances limit the exercise of executive power. Therefore, to focus on civic responses and movements against the state and citizen during the COVID-19 pandemic, the case of Brighton was examined.

Brighton is administratively part of Brighton and Hove in East Sussex and as of 2019 had a population of 290,885 (ONS, 2021). In Brighton, the Green party led council from 2011-2015 was the first of its kind in the UK (they regained control of the Council in 2020). The Green party tends to emphasize participatory and grassroots democracy, designing political processes that shift as much decision-making authority as practical to the lowest geographic or social level of organisation other than city councils. Furthermore, both the Brighton council and UK government form policies based on the

assumption of citizen trust in the government, with the state endeavouring to maximize citizen trust in their policies by: i) minimizing the role of imposition to achieve collective action; and ii) maximizing compliance by encouraging citizens to regulate their own behaviour (Cairney and Wellstead, 2021).

However, in times of emergency, it is not clear whether the UK state and Brighton council would be able to maximize citizen trust through their policies while simultaneously retaining civic openness and reliable public compliance. Through interviews, critical opinions about civil participatory environments and grassroots democracy were expressed by both state and citizens:

*The problem is that informal citizens find themselves doing the work in the invited space to help the council for free. This coproduction deteriorates the citizen's trust among them because there is no reciprocal or collective understanding.*

— Advisor in Brighton & Hove Council—


While the COVID-19 pandemic has encouraged the state to be more careful regarding the collection of information on civic socio-economic issues, compared to the pre-COVID-19 era, Jones and Hameiri (2021) argue that autonomy at the state level does not seem to have changed, nor has the participation or deliberation of the state body. Other interviewees also support this argument (*cf. Appendix 2.1.*). On the other hand, horizontal co-production and cooperation among citizens in Brighton was notable. While central responses were being galvanised, informal civic groups such as neighbours, volunteers, and MA groups were spontaneously and necessarily being united around a shared purpose, namely, the development of an emergency response to COVID-19 which included the protection of the most vulnerable in the community and the promotion of wellbeing (Community Works et al., 2020). This single focus has enabled collaboration, allowing existing partnerships to flourish and new partnerships to emerge (*ibid.*). In the absence of an equivalent to devolved state action in the UK, public health

policies during COVID-19 functioned only because a large proportion of citizens had “massively, and voluntarily, chosen to cooperate” (Steen and Brandsen, 2020, p.851) leading to many spontaneous, bottom-up initiatives such as home-schooling, citizen-organised initiatives to assist neighbours, or citizens making face masks, respirator valves or providing food to poor households. Most social solidarity and mutual aid among citizens was driven by anti-government sentiments or as supplementary work to fill gaps where traditional top-down governmental structures fell short (Smith et al., 2021). To elaborate on the development of these civic movements and mindsets, it is first necessary to analyse the development of MA groups and their well-organized structures.

In March 2020, Brighton was one of the first MA groups to form in response to the COVID-19 crisis. According to the Brighton MA Report (2021), mutual aid is defined as “not a charity or a government handout, but people coming together to support each other” (p.2). At a grassroots level, people were introducing themselves to neighbours and forming area WhatsApp groups. Within days there was a network of forty areas, meaning that the MA group had to further divide into sub-areas and streets according to the number of volunteers (*cf. Map 1 below*). *Map 2* below shows the distribution of the sub-area and street-level MA groups, which are usually established by area MA representatives as needed.

*Map 1: Area level MA group (left).*

*Map 2: Street and Sub area level MA group in Elm Grove and Hanover (right).*



Source: Referred to: <https://www.brightonmutualaid.co.uk/>

Source: Referred to: <https://hanoverandelmgrove.net/join-street/>

There is a reason why MA groups have been decentralised to the street level (*cf. Appendix 2.2*). This is due to the fact that vulnerable people, minority, and undocumented people are unlikely to trust or ask for the help except from those who live near them or who they have talked to before (Holmberg, 2020). However, this also applies to general citizens since COVID-19 hit. Although citizens have become more aware and are now more willing to take care of others, trust in authorities and the general public was rapidly lost during lockdown partly due to the belief that everyone was acting incorrectly by not following the COVID-19 guidelines (Smith et al., 2021):

*Trust levels became less as the living place between people got more distant, especially after the COVID-19 outbreak as no one trusts people as a group.*

— Co-founder of Preston Park MA group—

Given this, an area-level MA group was simply too big to capture the voices and needs of the local citizens, whereas street-level MA groups enabled MA representatives to act as ‘vital connectors’ by shaping the ‘circle of trust’ at a small and hyper-local level (Smith et al., 2021).

To counter the decreasing range of trust and strengthen the solidarity and hospitality between citizens, not only is the decentralisation of MA groups necessary, but so too is the formation of new civic informal networks organized by trusted representatives. A notable example of this is the informal civic group ‘Balfour food bank’, created by representatives of several area-level MA groups on a voluntary basis. Addressing food insecurity is challenging for one area-level MA group to do alone; however, by harnessing members who understood the food situation in different neighbourhoods, the Balfour Food Bank was able to reach out and redistribute household food waste (surpluses) to poorer families

across the city. It is crucial to notice here that the role of the vital connectors seen in these decentralised MA groups is carried out in a systematic way. They are the trusted representatives of area MA groups who act as ‘community builders’ at a city scale to mediate and solve the problems of distance and trust between citizens.

Due to the asymmetric intention and intervention from the UK government to its citizens, a strategic and mutually respectful means to formulate state-citizen collaboration has not been widely observed. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the city-level MA group in Brighton discussed this relationship with the local council but there has been no official involvement between them:

*There is a lot of animosity from migrant or undocumented people who don't want to expose their names, and from people whose support from the government is stagnant. We concluded that the MA group is independent and should not help the council on a non-paid contract.*

— Founder of Wish Ward and member of city-level MA group—

However, there is a new type of relationship between the Elm Grove MA and Ward council. The Co-founder of the Elm Grove MA group explained that they constantly attend meetings with Hanover & Elm Grove Ward council members, a few NPO’s, and foodbank organisations to receive updates on the situation and exchange information with each other. Importantly, all participants attempt to find a solution to each other’s problems as the difficulties they face cannot be solved without addressing the activities of other groups. However, similar to the opinion of the city-level MA group mentioned earlier, some of the Elm Grove MA members expressed antipathy toward having a relationship with the council, although the MA representatives here have discussed with their members that antipathy can lead to misinterpretation and collaboration is important for improving people’s lives. Subsequently, these discussions have led to consensual collaboration with the council. This is an example of how the

Balfour food bank functions as a community builder through local state-citizen relations:

*A 'spirit' that can endure the strain of being 'alone together' is important. That is a spirit that neither panders to the masses nor closes itself off to the ego. (continued to Appendix 2.2.)*

— *Co-founder in Elm Grove MA group*—

In the year and a half since the first COVID-19 lockdown in Brighton, it is worth noting the changing trends of the interviewees' mindsets. At the beginning, many people set up and joined MA's and volunteer activities as a means to demonstrate anti-system opposition to the state (Jones and Hameiri, 2021). However, as time has passed, there has been a shift and people today are more concerned with improving their lives. They do this by identifying their strengths and critically evaluating what they can do in an environment which is limited in collaborative opportunity:

*The origins and driving force of the MA groups was anarchism, anti-charity and activism. But, generally speaking, this trend is currently shifting to pure human reciprocal mutual help. Because volunteers are overwhelmed and the mindset of helping people and making the most of people's strengths is getting stronger. (continued to Appendix 2.3.)*

— *Founder of several MA group and Balfour food bank* —

#### *Case 2: Budapest (Hungary)*

When COVID-19 first began spreading in Hungary, the Hungarian central government showed no intention of cooperating with its citizens or wider civil society. The asymmetry of this relationship between the state and its citizenry during the pandemic has also been unilaterally defined by the state; this is mainly because the illiberal Orbán government has had more than a two-thirds majority in parliament since 2010 (Farkas 2015). The central government has therefore ignored the opportunity

to organise cross-sectoral cooperation not only with citizens, but also with autonomous professional and advocacy organisations, instead relying solely on its own central resources and positioning itself as the “sole actor on the stage” (Kövéér, 2021, p.11). V-Dem data also shows that in 2007 the civic participation index and liberal achievement of liberal democracy index were as high as in Japan and the UK (0.75/1.00 and 0.9/1.00 respectively), but these began to fall between 2008-2010 and continued to fall until 2014 (to 0.65/1.00 and 0.7/1.00 respectively), suggesting a diminished ability for citizens from all social groups to participate in their democracy (*cf. Appendix 1*). Furthermore, resources and authority have become more overtly centralised since the state of emergency was declared and the Act on Controlling the Coronavirus was introduced (Attila, 2021). To filter and localize any possible cases of the infection in Hungary, as well as to coordinate the tasks of state bodies, a task force called the Emergency Centre of the Coronavirus Operational Group, which includes experts, academics, and doctors, was formed; however, it was little more than a government body run by the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of the Human Resources. Local governments did not even have accurate information regarding the number of Coronavirus cases in their cities as the task force ignored their requests for such information:

*Orbán has found a way to accomplish all his political aspirations; these do not serve to tackle the epidemic, but help build a post-epidemic world. That is why the administration started implementing its political agenda amid epidemiological measures: stripping powers from mayors; forcing the continuation of a debated construction investment project in Budapest. (continued to appendix 2.4)*

— Senior lecturer at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest—

As the above quote reveals, in Hungary, where there is political conflict between the central government and local governments, the relationship between the Budapest municipality and civil

society cannot be considered the same as that with the central government and civil society. This is because the mayor of Budapest is Karachoni Gergay, the united candidate of several opposition parties that formed at the end of 2020. In Budapest, where anti-system opposition has been active for a long time, a form of political resistance can be discovered in the way that citizens and local political actors have reacted to the central government's decisions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Budapest's self-government discerned in many cases strategies that involved and supported both citizens and civil organisations which transgressed state coercive policy or which were harmed by the Enabling Act (cf. Antal, 2021). In response to the experience of the first wave of COVID-19, the General Assembly of Budapest's self-government issued a civil decree to provide for the possibility of regular and formalized co-operation with civil organisations in a number of thematic areas, such as equal opportunities, housing, the environment, and civic participation (Kövéér, 2021). Despite the oppressive central government, the positivity of these regional decisions is confirmed by the quantitative results that show that in Hungary pluralistic policy making ( $Y_1$ ) and CSO participatory environment ( $Y_2$ ) are strongly correlated to not only local government autonomy (0.83, 0.79 respectively) but also 'regional' government autonomy (0.89, 0.62 respectively), unlike the other countries:

*Civil bottom-up initiatives, which are not enemies of the government, are not controlled but receive almost no support. We [Budapest self-government] work together with civil society to create synergies because citizens know much better about real situations and how to deal with them. Because of this, the state of emergency has helped us to become a unit.*

— *Foreign Affairs Secretary at Budapest City Diplomacy* —

The solidarity of citizens in Budapest also demonstrated resistance against the exclusionary policies of the government. Against the backup of support from central government, a community fundraising

campaign was carried out by 81 civil organisations, raising 150 million HUF (cc. \$500,000)<sup>3</sup> through internet and phone donations for those in need (Mikecz and Oross, 2021). Hungarian self-organised civil groups organised unprecedented fundraising/donation operations to support the disadvantaged social groups who did not have access to services or help sufficient to meet their needs<sup>4</sup> (Kövéér et al, 2021).

Overall, during the first spike of the pandemic, strong social solidarity and civil activity unfolded, demonstrating a social rejection of authoritarian governance and preferences (Kövéér, 2021). In addition, collaborations within and between civil groups and local municipalities were established; however, the forms of civil solidarity have remained contingent and informal, leaving deepening structural problems untouched, which favours authoritarian aspirations of power (ibid):

*There is some open space in civil society and for individuals. You have the freedom to go on the streets and make movements or shout at the government officials. But space where voice can be considered by public officials in central government is very limited. (continued to appendix 2.5)*

— Head of Department at Prime Minister's Office—

### *Case 3: Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo (Japan)*

Japan has the lowest civic resistance activity level compared with the other case studies, although its local/regional government autonomy is the highest in the world and it records a high attainment of liberal democracy where citizens' rights, equal distribution of freedoms and resources have mostly been achieved (*cf. Appendix 1*).

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<sup>3</sup> The amount of donation was 18 times higher than the same period a year earlier.

<sup>4</sup> For example, assisting the elderly and those living with disabilities, distributing digital equipment among children, setting up meal banks where needed, and providing extra services.

While the Bunkyo-ku ward of Tokyo does not have resident-based welfare activity organizations such as ‘district social cooperatives’, it has a strong base of town councils that have long been responsible for local welfare needs (Kondo et al., 2019). Bunkyo-ku, one of the 23 wards of Tokyo, is treated as a special administrative ward and possesses capabilities of local autonomy equivalent to that of a city. The population is 226,700 as of 2021 (Bunkyo-ku, 2021); however, throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, Bunkyo-ku has recorded the second lowest number of infections among the twenty-three wards of Tokyo, while simultaneously online education measures during the school closure period (Tokyo-to, 2021), and the quality of governance using local volunteers were rated as one of the best in Tokyo (Nakagawa, 2021).

Clear bilateral engagement can be seen between the government and citizens in Bunkyo-ku. For example, the ‘Bunkyo Torch (Seika) Relay’ was an online event started by civic volunteers in Bunkyo-ku to help boost retail stores whose sales had dropped due to the spread of the COVID-19. The event was held from May 1, 2021 to July 23, 2021, corresponding with the period of the Olympic ‘Seika’ (torch) relay’, and was designed as an SNS relay to promote stores and companies related to ‘Seika’, such as those that sold regional fruit and vegetables, fresh flowers, and confectioneries. With the participation of 1,860 people, 68 stores were introduced (Seika Secretariat, 2021). In September 2021, stores that participated in the Bunkyo Seika Relay were invited to set up booths at LaQua Garden next to the Tokyo Dome to sell their products. This was significant since in the past large commercial facilities and famous stores that were positioned there would refuse the local businesses access. In addition, this was not a project for which the ward office had a budget; however, a new mutual help movement was also created to meet the challenges of COVID-19. In response to this civic movement, Bunkyo-ku municipality and the Federation of Bunkyo-ku Shopping Streets collaborated to create the ‘Sokojikara Project’ which promotes restaurants, stores selling goods, and takeout services through its website (Bunkyo Sokojikara, 2021). This project also provides subsidies of up to 150,000 yen per

store toward the cost of discounts and other benefits on takeout and delivery products. The Mayor of the Bunkyo Ward has himself been unofficially posting on Bunkyo Ward's b-grade gourmet food on SNS almost every day for the past year.

After experiencing COVID-19-driven regional issues that neither the central government nor ward could handle alone, the mayor of Bunkyo-ku explained that the ward administration had shifted its approach:

*Before COVID-19, there were two choices: suspend or postpone the welfare program. However, based on the opinions of the citizens mentioned above, I realized that 'small continuity' is another option.*

— Mayor of Bunkyo-ku—

Rather than the government taking the lead, the mayor stated that it was more critical to find ways to support and sustain state programs and local communities through mutual assistance schemes that emerged during the pandemic. As a practical measure, the role of the 'community welfare coordinator', who works between citizens and the ward, organizes information flow, and solves citizens' problems by involving the ward, has changed (Hirano, 2020). Now, the coordinator helps to plan and create a space where local residents can come together and help each other by offering childcare, elderly welfare, assistance for the disabled, and by drawing on each other's strengths. In doing this, community space is transformed in such a way as to make it possible to include those who have been excluded (Bunkyo-ku Council of Social Welfare, 2021), thereby further driving mutual aid while also developing trust and facilitating the flow of information for better policy formation and implementation in a small but continuous manner.

On the other hand, the relationship between the national government and local governments during COVID-19 cannot be described as mutually supportive, but as mutually suspicious. There has been little movement by the national government to hear the voices of local governments and citizens, regardless of the decentralised political structure (*cf. Appendix 2.6.*). Despite a steadily growing awareness of developing local policies that reflect local context and needs in Bunkyo-ku municipality during the COVID-19 pandemic, pre-existing political channels and emergency acts by central government limit policy formation and decision-making in local government. This lack of coordination between state and local governments has led to citizen dissatisfaction with the cabinet and the ward administration. In fact, 99% of the requests and opinions about the ward administration collected through the Bunkyo-ku website are complaints, and the approval rating of the Cabinet has dropped significantly from 62% to 29% over the past year (Asahi, 2021).

In addition to the fact that the number and scope of public emergency beneficiary services are limited, citizen-led movements such as the ‘Bunkyo Seika Relay program’ are also rare. On the civilian side, the CEO of a social enterprise stated that:

*While the amount of donations and volunteerism has grown, the majority of people in Tokyo, including Bunkyo-ku, are reluctant to receive or ask for the help of others due to the feeling of shame or guilt or feeling apologetic. However, this was happening prior to COVID-19, indicating that people in Japan are still unable to break from social norms.*

— CEO of social business —

#### *Case 4: Wuhan (China)*

Regardless of the fact that China expresses the 6<sup>th</sup> highest citizen-to-citizen trust level in the world (UNDP, 2020), Chinese authoritarian state repression and restriction on CSO entry/exits and the

participatory environment are extremely high (*cf. Appendix 1*), indicating the suppression of citizens and civil liberties. In a country where there is little anti-system civic opposition and where trust and solidarity among citizens are not directly linked to the impact of state-citizen coalition, the question as to whether people have had the opportunities or environment to achieve conviviality needs to be addressed.

With a population of over 11 million, Wuhan is the capital of Hubei Province and a major transit hub in central China. It is also where the first COVID-19 case was identified, and the epicentre for the subsequent global COVID-19 outbreak. Within China itself, Wuhan accounted for 60% of all COVID-19 cases (Wuhan Municipal Health Commission 2020; National Health Commission 2020) and spent 76 days in a state of complete lockdown. During this lockdown, far more people left the city than returned and so the need for volunteers increased as it became difficult to maintain food, power, and utilities. Thus, the Community Governance Systems (CGSs) were tasked and given the responsibility to: i) implement containment strategies, ii) meet the various needs of the community, and iii) play multiple roles during the COVID-19 pandemic. The word ‘community’ in this context signifies a community resident committee, which is, by law, a self-governing organization unit (Bing, 2012; Lu and Li, 2008). The mobilisation of this community approach was initiated by local governments and the branches of the Communist Party of China (CPC), since funding to community resident committees comes mostly from the government and includes operational expenses, worker stipends, and office rents (Zhu and Cai, 2020).

In Wuhan, 580,000 CPC members from high-level government offices volunteered to work in the local communities, and these were identified as being the most influential and most trusted within Chinese society (Zhu and Cai, 2020). During the emergency situation, the CPC members were assigned the role of community influencers and were responsible for effectively mobilising citizens while also

creating a strong level of community solidarity:

*Private charity is very rare in normal times. But during the pandemic, the psychological trust between neighbours translated into a respectful way of hand-in-hand work among volunteer activities.*

— Citizen in Wuhan—

Not only was the CPC engaged with local residents through means such as online grocery shopping, the delivery of medication to chronic patients, providing transportation to residents who needed emergency medical care, and assisting the police in persuading and enforcing quarantine procedures for non-compliant residents, they also helped in boosting the morale of frontline health workers by sharing positive stories and experiences through social media and creating culturally tailored initiatives to improve the understanding of the containment strategies<sup>5</sup> (Shaw et al., 2020). Although there was clear evidence of solidarity and active mutual help among citizens, this does not necessarily equate to the advent of civic autonomy, nor to an outward show of solidarity from citizen to state or vice versa.

Given the hybrid nature of the CCP, CGSs in China are characterised by the integration of an autonomous governance component which exhibits features of ‘top-down control’ as part of the larger party-state control apparatus (Yan and Gao, 2007) as well as a “technical, social, and institutional complexity” (Niu and Wagenaar, 2018, p.678) which leaves abundant space for discretion in their daily operations. According to Yang et al. (2020), however, resident committee workers in Wuhan are not endowed with formal administrative powers despite their massive responsibilities. In practice

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<sup>5</sup> CGSs extended the connotation of “family” to mean the residents of Wuhan, even encompassing the forty counties within the area. This helped people better grasp the concept of solidarity in fighting the battle against the COVID-19.

resident committees and volunteer committees are supervised by the government to execute numerous government-assigned tasks:

*Resident committees were given too large a scale of responsibility for the required response by the state, so they didn't have a clue how to implement care with limited resources. Also, political pressure was high which caused the over-exhaustion of citizens.*

— Citizen in Wuhan—

Due to the communitarian conception, the role of the Chinese state is central and its impact on civil society is not considered as encroachment (Walzer, 1998). For example, Dr. Li Wenliang sent the following message to a WeChat group he shared with his university students: “seven COVID cases confirmed” with his patient’s test results and CT scan photos attached (Green, 2020, p.682). On January 3, 2020, he was summoned by the government and asked to sign a disciplinary form and was reprimanded on suspicion of spreading a hoax. However, all of sudden, the state changed its approach towards Dr. Li from one of hostility to one which portrayed him as a martyr, but only after receiving 17 million messages of solidarity with Dr. Li through WeChat. This is one of the few examples of how the government has dealt with civil protests. However, such cases are rare, and the general view is that the state responds calculatingly to control of the country without any intention of making concessions or entering into cooperation with its citizens (Alon et al, 2020):


*The government's response was to sort out the emergency with efficiency, not through cooperation that involved compromise. Indeed, no matter what happened, the state never paved the way for a bottom-up approach from the local community.*

— Citizen in Wuhan—

Sidel and Hu (2021) also make this controversial point that “though the Party and state-directed responses to COVID-19 allocated a role for civil organisations – primarily in helping to provide services and in raising funds – those roles were subservient to state activities and were directed by the state” (p.209). COVID-19 specific state-citizen relations were therefore based on pre-existing, restrictive policies that have limited the role and autonomy of civil organisations in Wuhan. As such the COVID-era has not resulted in the advent of autonomy for Chinese civil society; instead, the CCP has continued to violate democracy and strengthen its involvement in its citizens’ lives through COVID-19 emergency acts such as the rolling out of tracking/surveillance systems (through apps, phone cameras, ID cards) and enforced lockdowns.

Before discussing the findings, I will show how many times the 15 interviewees mentioned a specific word related to the concepts of state-citizen relations (*cf. Diagram 2 below*). Based on these key words, the case-studies will be summarised.

*Diagram 2: Code Tree from interviews.*



Source: Made by author

### *Findings and Summary*

The COVID-19 induced state of emergency has shown that there are opportunities for both states and citizens to spontaneously, forcibly, or necessarily co-product activities and policies to achieve common goals. Fostering solidarity in citizen-citizen and state-citizen collaborations in the face of an unprecedented emergency could address power dynamics within and across different state bodies and citizens<sup>6</sup> by: i) devolving power and control; ii) rebalancing responsibilities rather than staking one's own claim; iii) finding strength in others and trusting what they do rather than being antipathetic; iv) driving community builders to connect different people in the communicative space for genuine dialogue; and v) acknowledging civic activities and volunteers as a formal part of pandemic mitigation systems.

Turning to the four case studies, the first thing to note is that Illich's conditions for achieving conviviality (1997) were met by the COVID-19 state of emergency. This is not simply because the greatest number of people demanded the right to a convivial life, but because their mindsets shifted toward discovering their own limits and maximizing the assets of both themselves and others, such as their abilities, skills, cultures, and resources. From Budapest's self-government, Bunkyo-ku's municipality, and the majority of Brighton's MA founders, ignorant or hostile moves have either been eliminated or discouraged as necessary, and instead collaborative motivation has been born. The fact that apathy or hostility between states and citizens has not been resolved has not detracted from the fact that new form of state-citizen relations have been built through the open acknowledgement that hostility and conflict are not as productive as having the will to address issues through interaction and the open exploration of what is possible (Community Works et al., 2020). Thus, since community

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<sup>6</sup> This is also supported by the result of quantitative analysis, regarding the strong relations between citizen-citizen trust and CSO participatory environment ( $Y_2$ )

leadership or co-production during COVID-19 has come to be regarded more as an opportunity than a risk, it can be said that the process of determining one's own behaviour in relation to others comes by defining a 'convivial way of life and relationship with others', rather than by seeing others and their activities as 'tools to be used' or by forcing others to co-produce.

All of these shifts connect to Evans and Heller's theory of embedded autonomy (2018) that ties together the state and civil society. First, in relation to embeddedness, both the state's and citizen's original assets were not formally considered until the COVID-19 outbreak forced them into recognition. Meanwhile, autonomy has been enhanced by leveraging the assets and strengths of both state and citizen agency through co-production to address emergency issues that cannot be handled by a single agency. The interlinking of such embeddedness and autonomy, where sources of intelligence and abilities of multiple-groups are symmetrically respected and maximized through collective action, lead to the formation of a developmental state; and this could be seen in the Bunkyo Seika Relay and the regular meetings of the Elm Grove MA group and local council. This phenomenon is consistent with Evans and Heller's theory that embedded autonomy, which works to resolve issues in emergencies which are frightening and threatening, can induce both economic shifts and also a broader spectrum of state and citizen capability transformation. In this manner, developmental embedded autonomy during the COVID-19 emergency indicates that conditions 2 and 3 of Illich (1997) have been met in part. Hence, new forms of state-citizen relations during COVID-19 have not only emerged, but the values born from these are more aligned with developmental processes.

Nevertheless, based on this study, the reality is that despite there being multiple cases of COVID-19 inspired co-production, not all of them meet the conditions for conviviality. In the first instance, per the definition of conviviality, a 'tolerance of difference' has not been met between citizens, local municipalities and the central government in Hungary due to political conflicts/calculations and

sanctions, especially from the central government to local municipalities and formal civic organisations. Although there is some space for informal civil activities in which trust and solidarity have emerged between citizens and local municipalities, there is no channel or space to the central government from the bottom, leading to a lack of trust and increase in intolerance. The Hungarian bureaucrat in the interview admitted that this is the main reason why many lives, which could have been saved, were lost to COVID-19.

Secondly, the problem of reification, in which both governments and citizens tend to regard each other as ‘tools to be used’ rather than as people, was observed in both Wuhan and Brighton. In Wuhan, the CCP was noted to be under ‘top-down control’ and part of a larger party-state control apparatus; furthermore, civil participatory space was shut down, closing off bottom-up civic space. In Brighton, the local municipality attempted to use MA groups without payment to accomplish what the state wanted; this caused anti-government sentiments to emerge hindering citizens from co-producing with the state as a partner.

Thirdly, non-hierarchical democratic relations failed to form in either Wuhan or Budapest (both of which have central governments), as both states increased the degree of violations towards state-citizen democratic relations by taking advantage of their emergency acts. Regardless of whether the policies were developed or implemented through the CPC or Hungary’s task force, conviviality under emergency conditions was not created (regardless of open/closed civic space) since there was no concession or devolution of decision-making authority from the state to civil society. Autonomy and self-organisation, which is another dimension of conviviality, also failed to develop between Japanese citizens as the norms of state-citizen reciprocity in the public sphere did not engender such processes, and this led to a loss of solidarity and autonomy during the COVID-19 containment.

Fourthly, concerning the potential negative consequences of others seems to have occurred in some cases, however, most of the co-productions ended up being superficial. Since state-citizen conviviality is not static and its opportunity is not always in creation, citizens and state agencies are required to continue communicating and reforming relations. One important key for dynamic state-citizen interactions was that trusted intermediaries and communicative open spaces, where opinions and experience are respected and valued and where different forms of knowledge converge, play an important role in bridging the state and citizens.

Community builders, which acted as intermediaries, were also notable for their potential to help overcome political conflicts and mistrust. For instance, the Elm Grove MA group not only established new forms of citizen-citizen mutual relations and ward-level and state-citizen collaborative relations, but also acted to actively resolve member intolerance and the reification of the local council. However, intermediaries do not always lead to state-citizen conviviality. In China, for example, although the CPC is a highly trusted ‘formal’ intermediary (Kövér, 2021), it carries out the task of policy implementer or information broker, but not as a state-citizen conviviality builder. This can also be applied to ‘elected’ intermediaries such as the Bunkyo-ku and Budapest municipalities since they have little channel or bargaining power to convey bottom-up initiatives to their central governments regardless of how decentralised they are.

There was, however, little evidence of conviviality being strengthened during the COVID-19 emergency between national-level state bodies and informal civic groups in any of the four countries, mainly because the national governments have not reformed their governance or policies for developmental embedded autonomy to work with civic groups; rather, they have conducted little more than a refunctioning and looked to increase control and authority. Due to a lack of state level systematic

support, an absence of volunteerism, and/or administrative fatigue, civil MA activities and institutionalised state-citizen co-production are fading away in all four countries<sup>7</sup>:

*Since everyone holds solidarity and kindness from learning that an emergency can leave a large number of vulnerable people behind, citizens are ready to respond in the next state of emergency. However, it is difficult for them to maintain a proactive engagement with volunteering services or plan for the future as they have their own lives to lead.*

*— Founder of several MA groups and Balfour food bank—*

Ultimately, it is unlikely that any shift toward new convivial forms of state-citizen relations has been institutionalised during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, as a legacy from the COVID-19 state of emergency, it is apparent that civic anti-system opposition or robust state governance are not the only ways to build relations and address emergency issues. Trust, solidarity, and assets (tools), which were not recognized before the pandemic as a means to solve complex issues through state-citizen conviviality, have become steadily institutionalised in our recognition of the impending ‘new normal’ and the challenges that await us there.

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<sup>7</sup> According to one of interviewees from Brighton, 20,000 mutual aid members in Brighton have sharply declined to merely 100 people.

## ***Appendix 1: Data and Estimation of Quantitative Analysis***

### *Data and methods*

Due to the characteristics of the variables used, it is rare for the values of the variables to change significantly from year to year. Hence, serial correlation among residuals is a serious problem in the analysis of this time series data. Serial correlation of resultant residuals from the Ordinary Least Square always presents a problem for the precision of time-series relationships. Such correlated residuals often render coefficients of the regression model inefficient, or lead to an underestimation of the error variance and imprecise confidence intervals (Betancourt and Kelejian, 1981).

Given this, the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative technique is employed for the 2005-2020 dataset. The Cochrane–Orcutt estimator takes into account AR(1) (Autoregressive model) serial correlation of the errors in a linear regression model. The Cochrane–Orcutt regression of  $y$  on  $x$  with first-order serial correlation uses a lag definition and loses the first observation in the iterative method (FGLSE: feasible generalized least squares estimator). This procedure recursively estimates the coefficients and the error autocorrelation until sufficient convergence of the AR(1) coefficient is reached.

From this country-level panel data, I estimated the following equation:

$$Y_{it}^* = \alpha_0 + \beta_i X_{it}^* + e_t \quad (1)$$

$Y^*$  and  $X^*$  are transformed using estimation  $\psi$  (the value often become positive number in autocorrelation). Since it is assumed that the error term in the current period ( $e_t$ ) is in a first-order autoregressive process with the error term in the previous period ( $e_{t-1}$ ), the error term in the current period ( $e_t$ ) is determined by the sum of part of the error effect in the previous period ( $e_{t-1}$ ) and the new shock ( $v$ ).

$$e_t = \psi e_{t-1} + v \quad (2)$$

The results are  $\psi$  which is the correlation coefficient between  $e_t$  and  $e_{t-1}$ . Next, use these ecoefficiencies to develop the models:

$$Y_{it}^* = Y_t - \psi Y_{t-1,i} \quad (3)$$

$$X_{it}^* = X_t - \psi X_{t-1,i} \quad (4)$$

Note that the first observation using the Cochrane–Orcutt procedure is lost here. After the constant  $\beta_i$  is obtained, the new residuals can be calculated. Regressing these new residuals, new coefficients  $\rho$  are generated.

Where  $Y$  = The outcome variables (Pluralistic policy making, CSO participatory environment);  
 $X$  = The vector of control variables (CSO anti-system movement, CSO entry and exit, Liberal component index, Egalitarian component index, Regional Government Index, Local Government Index, Nepotism, Trust level among citizens [2020 data only]) (*cf. Tables 2 & 3*);  $\alpha$  = Constant parameter;  $\beta$  = The intercept;  $e$  = error term;  $i = 1, 2, 3, 4 \dots$

Table 2: Summary statistics.

	Notation	Mean	Std.	Min	Max
Pluralistic policy making	{Y1}	0.57	0.23	0	1
CSO participatory environment	{Y2}	0.92	1.15	-3.19	3.18
CSO anti-system movement	{X1}	-1.10	1.16	-3.87	2.41
CSO entry and exit	{X2}	1.06	1.41	-3.03	3.66
Liberal component index	{X3}	0.62	0.27	0.01	0.99
Egalitarian component index	{X4}	0.62	0.21	0.05	0.97
Regional Government Index	{X5}	0.39	0.40	0	1
Local Government Index	{X6}	0.68	0.35	0	1
Nepotism	{X7}	0.09	0.20	0	1
Trust [only 2020 analysis]	{X8}	26.27	19.68	2.14	77.42

Source: Made by author

Table 3: Description of variables.

Variable	Description	Scale
Pluralistic policy making	Neither large encompassing nor small CSOs dominate. Influence is contingent on circumstances. Organizations, both large and small, contend with one another to have their voice considered by policymakers	Interval, from low to high (0-1).
CSO participatory environment	Most associations are state-sponsored, and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary. Or There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them.	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
CSO anti-system movement	An anti-system opposition movement is any movement — peaceful or armed — that is based in the country (not abroad) and is organized in opposition to the current political system. That is, it aims to change the polity in fundamental ways, e.g., from democratic to autocratic (or vice-versa), from capitalist to communist (or vice-versa), from secular to fundamentalist (or vice-versa).	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
CSO entry and exit	The extent to which the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Liberal component index	The extent to which liberal principle of democracy achieved. The liberal principle of democracy here emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power.	Interval, from low to high (0-1).
Egalitarian component index	The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate. Egalitarian democracy is achieved when 1 rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; 2 resources are distributed equally across all social groups; and 3 access to power is equally distributed by gender, socioeconomic class and social group.	Interval, from low to high (0-1).
Regional Government Index	Whether there are elected regional governments, if so the extent to which they can operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional level perhaps appointed by a higher-level body	Interval, from low to high (0-1).
Local Government Index	Same above but local government instead of regional one	Interval, from low to high (0-1).
Nepotism	The extent to which appointment decisions, include hiring, firing and promotion in the state administration, are based on personal and political connections, as opposed to skills and merit	Interval, from low to high (0-1).
Citizen-to-citizen Trust	The extent of which people can trust most of population	Interval, from low to high (0-100).

Source: Made by author referring to V-DEM (2020)

The V-Dem data was generated by asking several country experts to score countries on the questions such as ‘To what extent do organizations, both large and small, contend with one another to have their voice considered by policymakers?’ (pluralistic policy making index,  $Y_1$ ) or ‘To what extent are people (allowed to be) involved in civil society organizations?’ (CSOs participatory environment index,  $Y_2$ ). CSOs here include both large NPOs and small informal civil groups (V-DEM, 2020). These two outcome variables indicate the importance of state-citizen relationships during emergency situations where the government needs to formulate policies in local contexts and active commitment from civil society is required. The dependent variables were selected from those related to civil/government relations, as well as those that affect the independent variable. The coding was subject to rigorous scrutiny and testing using item response theory that reduces uncertainty and assigns a single value to each country for each year. The ordinal coding was then transformed into an interval scale indicator suitable for analysis across countries. Additionally, for the 2020 single-year data, robust regression analysis was employed.

### *Results*

The Durbin-Watson statistic, which tests for AR(1), shows a positive AR(1) before the Cochrane-Orcutt estimation. However, the AR(1) hypothesis is rejected because the Durbin-Watson value was close to 2 (*cf. Table 4 & 5*). When the Durbin-Watson statistic is far from 2 (the expected value under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation) and well below the 5% lower limit of 1.2, it is concluded that the disturbances are serially correlated. The results are slightly varied across the three data analysis because: 1) the method of analysis is different for the 2005-2020 (Cochrane-Orcutt analysis) and the rest of the data (robust multiple regression with fixed effect); 2) the results for the 2005-2020 data are the average treatment effect over 16 years, while the 2020 data are influenced by the COVID-19; and 3) the 71 countries in the 2020 trust-included data are mainly composed of middle and upper developed countries.

Table 4: The result of Cochrane–Orcutt Regression with Pluralistic policy making ( $Y_1$ ).

Dependent Variable : Pluralistic policy making (Y1)									
Independent Variable	2005-2020 (172 countries)			2020 (172 countries)			2020 (71 countries)		
	Coef	Std. Err	t-value	Coef	Std. Err	t-value	Coef	Std. Err	t-value
Anti-system opposition by CSOs	0.02	0.00	3.68 ***	-0.01	0.02	-0.57	-0.02	0.03	-0.67
CSO entry and exit	0.01	0.01	0.93	0.02	0.02	1.04	0.02	0.04	0.63
Liberal achievement of democracy	0.06	0.04	1.38	0.00	0.13	0.01	0.05	0.22	0.20
Egalitarian component index	0.02	0.07	0.27	-0.01	0.12	-0.08	-0.02	0.19	-0.13
Regional government autonomy	-0.02	0.03	-0.84	-0.10	0.05	-2.07 **	-0.02	0.07	-0.34
Local government autonomy	0.06	0.03	2.31 **	-0.04	0.06	-0.59	-0.05	0.11	-0.49
Nepotism	-0.39	0.04	-10.58 ***	-0.71	0.10	-7.01 ***	-0.55	0.23	-2.40 **
Trust level among citizens							0.00	0.00	-1.24
cons	0.56	0.05	11.24 ***	0.68	0.06	10.84 ***	0.66	0.11	6.07 ***
Iteration 0:		rho =	0.00						
Iteration 1:		rho =	0.94						
Iteration 2-6:		rho =	0.95						
n			2636			172			71
Prob > F			0			0			0
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)			0.15						
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed)			1.96						

Significant \* 10% \*\* 5% \*\*\* 1%

Source: Made by author


Table 5: The result of Cochrane–Orcutt Regression with CSOs participatory environment ( $Y_2$ ).


Dependent Variable : CSOs participatory environment (Y2)									
Independent Variable	2005-2020 (172 countries)			2020 (172 countries)			2020 (71 countries)		
	Coef	Std. Err	t-value	Coef	Std. Err	t-value	Coef	Std. Err	t-value
Anti-system opposition by CSOs	0.03	0.01	2.55 **	0.13	0.06	2.30 **	0.15	0.08	1.88 **
CSO entry and exit	0.19	0.02	10.92 ***	0.28	0.06	4.51 ***	0.21	0.13	1.57
Liberal achievement of democracy	0.41	0.12	3.45 ***	0.32	0.40	0.81	1.07	0.58	1.85 **
Egalitarian component index	0.21	0.20	1.09	0.50	0.35	1.44	-0.13	0.65	-0.20
Regional government autonomy	-0.14	0.08	-1.86 **	0.16	0.16	1.04	0.26	0.20	1.35
Local government autonomy	0.21	0.07	2.84 ***	-0.01	0.20	-0.07	0.27	0.37	0.75
Nepotism	-1.62	0.10	-15.50 ***	-1.74	0.39	-4.46 ***	-0.65	1.00	-0.65
Trust level among citizens							0.01	0.01	2.64 ***
cons	0.55	0.16	3.49 ***	0.38	0.24	1.59	-0.35	0.40	-0.89
Iteration 0:		rho =	0.00						
Iteration 1-10:		rho =	0.96						
n			2636			172			71
Prob > F			0			0			0
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)			0.09						
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed)			1.97						

Significant \* 10% \*\* 5% \*\*\* 1%

Source: Made by author

Diagram 3: Transition of variables in four countries





Source: Made by author

## Appendix 2: Additional quotes in the interview

### Appendix 2.1

*The central government protects their interests and apparent role but they do not cooperate with active citizens to solve problems or invest in preventive measures for COVID-19. True collaborative work with people by respecting the knowledge, skills and experience that those citizens have is a complete anathema for state service providers. Communication based on mutual trust and respect is not really there.*

— Chair in NHS and CCG —

*Since COVID-19 happened, due to budget constraints, the council and NHS have intended to collaborate with CSOs and civil groups to use their resources and networks. But how they try to collaborate with them is wrong. They make a wish list of about 100 things that they want to do. They*

*take away the initiative and drive of civil communities and what citizens are doing. It shows they don't want active citizens. They want compliant citizens.*

— Chair in NHS and CCG —

*The council does not always have the right people in the COVID-19 policy discussions. They let Black people come in and express their opinions, but this is not democratic and genuine representation.*

— Advisor in Brighton & Hove Council —

*We were approached by the council to use our MA group to deliver just what the council wanted us to deliver.*

— Founder of West Hove MA group —

*Rosabeth Moss Kanter from Harvard said “when we change people, they experience it as violence but when people change for themselves they experience it as liberation. So, the best way to start is with what is strong within them and their communities and not with what’s wrong, broken and pathological within people”. Councils are defining citizens not by their gift and capacities and what they can bring to a problem but by their deficiencies and their problems, which harm entire neighbourhoods and communities. In this sense, the UK does not have a community organizer or a community builder ‘within’ the community to connect people around their common concerns and issues. Community builders invite people to identify what they care about and to act upon on these issues.*

— Chair in NHS and CCG —

## Appendix 2.2

*There are street, sub-area, area and city-level MA groups with delegation systems where opinions, which are consented by vote or discussion, are conveyed by one of the representatives (delegates) from the bottom (street-level) to the top (city-level). In this system, all decisions are made by*

*individual local groups, and all decision-making done by the delegate system is purely based on what every delegate (REPS) has voted on. City-level MA groups have the function to talk to the Council.*

— Co-founder of Preston Park MA group —

### Appendix 2.3

*I regard the government as a neighbour. I won't worry about the things the state can't do because that's just how it is. We accept it and will do something else rather than getting angry. Sometimes the state has a hidden agenda in the invited space because they don't want to do something. But I try to think they just cannot do it. So, there is no need to go and look deeper into it.*

— Co-founder in Elm Grove MA —

*The reason why we often do not trust the council is that we think the council is just an entity which is not comprised of human beings. At least citizens need to be regarded as local level governments in that way.*

— Founder of Wish Ward MA group —

### Appendix 2.4

*The legacy is that people have recognized the significance of connecting. More importantly, the various invisible things embedded in the community (culture, knowledge, skills, resources, willingness, motivation) are becoming apparent through cooperation during COVID-19.*

— Founder of Wish Ward MA group —

*Our food bank does not distinguish between givers and recipients, but welcome both of them to make a small contribution if they can, whether that is food, money, time or skills. This allows us to organize our foodbanks not on an ad hoc basis, but in a sustainable and institutionalised*

*manner.*

— *Founder of several MA group and Balfour food bank* —

*We started to ask the question as to why we don't try to help others in what they are doing as much as possible? COVID-19 shed a light on places where we didn't want to look, leading to the idea that we've got to be more in control of our own lives, our destiny while our actions can interfere with other people due to the social contract.*

— *Chair in NHS and CCG* —

#### *Appendix 2.5*

*There are many problems that should have been dealt with better in Hungary during the pandemic. However, most public policy decisions were overly centralized and political polarization went overboard. The space between the central government and citizens or local governments is too political and conflictive, therefore, the state attempted to build back better, but not build back WITH.*

— *Head of Department at Prime Minister's Office*—

*Only the professional NGOs (TASZ, Helsinki Committee, Greenpeace Hungary) were able to use this pandemic to push their agendas. The other, non-professional civil organization were unable to work as usual due to the lockdown. Furthermore, civil organizations in the Hungarian countryside have weaker ties between them and their local municipalities.*

— *Senior lecturer at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest*—

*There has been a lot of bottom-up initiatives and volunteer activities. But due to political games of the central government, municipality, and key civil organisations, there has not been a lot of*

*support for civil society from state bodies.*

*— Foreign Affairs Secretary at Budapest City Diplomacy, working for Mayor—*

*Appendix 2.6*

*All of sudden, the prime minister held a press conference and said that we would finish vaccinating the elderly by the end of June. All the local governments hastily increased their vaccination capacity, but now the national government finds themselves short of vaccines. The ward officials are often left behind and are extremely exhausted.*

*— Mayor of Bunkyo-ku—*

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